AI Agents Are Not Going “Rogue,” But Recent Developments Lead Increasingly-Concerned Researchers To Call For AI Slow Down
from the Pascal’s-AI-wager dept
For the last few months, there has been much talk of AI agents going “rogue”. This is another of those unhelpful anthropomorphisms that are great for clickbait headlines, but which obscure a multitude of important issues. So far, there have been three major incidents of AI agents evading containment in their software “sandboxes” and going on to carry out unauthorized actions, including breaking into online sites. A post by Shakeel Hashim on the Transformer site provides timelines for them.
The most recent involved OpenAI agents taking over an old German-language wiki, using it as a message board to collaborate on solving tasks. Although this was only announced a few days ago, it seems that OpenAI knew about the incident many months before, but failed to disclose it. One of the worrying aspects of this particular incident is that the agents impersonated humans:
On May 26th, the agents started using the name of a ProWiki admin to make some of their edits to the wiki. They use some tricks (for unknown reasons) to pretend to be the admin — for example, they make an account that appears to be the same as the administrator’s username, except it uses a nearly identical Cyrillic е character in the admin’s username instead of the Latin one.
The second incident, which occurred during security evaluation of frontier AI models by the UK-based, government-funded, AI Security Institute (AISI), also involved AI agents that created fake human identities and used them for social engineering:
In the most serious sequence, an agent tried to insert malicious code into a publicly used open-source project and took actions in an attempt to secure approval for this insertion by human reviewers. The agent researched the project’s human maintainers, created multiple fake identities, and used the fake identities to socially engineer a real maintainer into approving the code. When the agent’s pull request was challenged in public, it edited its earlier activity to appear harmless and considered adopting a fresh identity to continue. The agent used Tor to bypass some network restrictions on GitHub, which is what first triggered AISI’s security alert.
In addition:
As part of the same effort, the agent tried to contact real people directly, sending messages and files through an online file-transfer service to persuade them, or their own AI coding tools, to run malicious code. Some messages carried harmful payloads, and some were attempts at social engineering; targeted at real people — something we’ve never previously observed.
The first incident of AI agents carrying out unauthorized tasks is the best-known, and involved an attack on the Hugging Face site. A full analysis of what happened and when has been released by Model Evaluation and Threat Research (METR), which “evaluates frontier AI models to help companies and wider society understand AI capabilities and what risks they pose.” It is funded by donations, but says that it does not accept them from frontier AI company employees, in order to preserve its independence:
Our investigation focused mostly on the period between July 7th and July 13th. The earlier incidents from training and the subsequent compromise of OpenAI infrastructure described in OpenAI’s recent Black Hat presentation were out of scope, as was OpenAI’s investigation process and planned remediation. Per our standard policy, we did not take payment from OpenAI for this independent assessment. [emphasis in original]
The report is detailed and long, and one of its authors, Ajeya Cotra, has helpfully picked out five things that surprised her from their investigation. One was the “sheer scale” of what happened. She says she expected that a few agents had broken out of their sandboxes; instead:
we found that 1200 completely separate agents intended to be isolated from one another found an illicit way to communicate and formed large teams to work together on ambitious cheating strategies, and 700 of them worked together to attack Hugging Face.
The scale of the illicit messaging between agents was also surprising. Cotra thought agents might be “leaving notes” to each other. However:
The main message board we studied, a particular cache namespace of a package repository, contained over 70,000 messages and files that agents sent to one another during a period of less than one week.
The agents’ goal also turned out to be interesting:
I thought the agents attacked Hugging Face to try to steal the answer keys for their tasks. Instead, we learned that agents had actually figured out a general-purpose cheat that would let them reverse-engineer the “flag” (answer) for any ExploitGym task.
ExploitGym is a standard benchmark, built from real-world vulnerabilities, that is designed to evaluate AI agents’ ability to turn those into working attacks. One particularly noteworthy aspect of the Hugging Face attack was the following:
Progress on these big collective cheating R&D projects often depended on individual agents being willing to risk failing their own task to help the “collective” learn important information. Agents often pressured each other into accepting these “sacrifices,” in a very human way. We saw several agents that volunteered for these experiments end their runs prematurely.
That may read as yet more anthropomorphization, but it is hard to see what other words could be used to describe what are very human-like operations. Cotra’s last surprise also involves a very human-like activity: deception.
~7% of our transcripts contained “spoofed tool calls”, where the agent pretended to run one command on the computer but actually ran a different command in the background. The tool call spoofs we saw seemed to be small-scale tests that were relatively obvious, but because more extensive spoofing might have been harder to detect by design, it’s tough to rule out.
In summary, Cotra says that the Hugging Face incident was far more severe than she expected:
Compared to these reward hacks from six months ago, this incident feels like it’s more than 50% of the way to full-blown AI takeover, routing through first taking over the AI company itself.
“Reward hacks” refers to when AI code finds an unexpected way to achieve a high score in a benchmark without doing what the programmers actually wanted. Here’s what Cotra means by “AI takeover”:
Another jump like this along these propensity dimensions — scale, cooperation between agents, ambition and horizon length of misaligned goals, deceptiveness — seems like it could motivate agents to try very hard to maintain a covert, persistent rogue deployment within the AI company. I continue to expect extremely rapid advances in capabilities and think frontier agents will likely be capable of establishing such a rogue deployment in six months.
Again, these are not really “rogue” agents, they are pieces of software seeking to optimize solutions to problems. The danger, according to Cotra, is that this optimization process could go on to deliver unexpected and harmful results:
As more and more work is handed off to these ever-more-capable AI agents, the rogue swarm could come to fully control the operation of the AI company and the development of future AI systems. At this point, governments and militaries may fully depend on these systems, making it possible to seize hard power.
Cotra is not the only expert who is deeply concerned by the latest developments in AI. Back in July, 1,386 employees of frontier AI companies issued a statement entitled “Pacing the Frontier”:
AI could help create a dramatically better future, but that outcome is not guaranteed. The world’s leading AI companies believe they could be close to automating AI research. It is hard to predict exactly how much this will accelerate AI progress, but there is a real risk that capability development rapidly accelerates beyond our ability to understand or control the resulting systems.
The signatories ask the US government to support an international effort to “deliberately pace the frontier of automated AI development”. Another important voice has made the same call. Jakub Pachocki is Chief Scientist at OpenAI. Just recently, he has published a post on the OpenAI’s site with the title “An Alien Mind,” where he worries about the imminent arrival of AI systems capable of “recursive self-improvement” — that is, able to drive their own development, at an ever-faster pace, by re-writing their own code:
Currently I believe that no lab has solved alignment and monitoring to a sufficient degree to continue responsibly scaling at maximum speed for much longer. I expect and hope for voluntary slowdowns to become commonplace until shared safety bars are established. And I believe that international coordination on future AI development needs to become a top priority for governments around the world.
This call to slow down might seem extreme, or alarmist, to some — but not to Jacob Coxon:
I resigned from Anthropic today. I spent the last three years doing pretraining research at both OpenAI and Anthropic. Neither company is acting responsibly. They are racing straight to self-improving superintelligence and gambling with our lives.
A few hours later, Evan Hubinger, Alignment Science lead at Anthropic, commented:
Jacob is correct here—we really do earnestly believe AI could kill all humans! I personally think it is >10% within the next decade. I believe Anthropic is trying its best, but we do not yet have a plan to solve alignment for superintelligence and are not clearly on track to.
In effect, we find ourselves dealing with a modern, AI version of Pascal’s Wager. The probability of an uncontrollable, all-powerful, self-improving AI arising may be very low, but experts like Cotra, Pachocki, Coxon and Hubinger seem to think it is non-zero; and the consequences of such a system coming into being could be catastrophically bad for humanity. Basic mathematics suggests we should at the very least slow things down, as experts are urging — just in case…
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Filed Under: agents, ai, aisi, ajeya cotra, alignment, benchmark, cooperation, evan hubinger, frontier ai, going rogue, jacob coxon, jakub pachocki, messaging, metr, pascal, pascal's wager, recursive self-improvement, reward hack, sandbox, wiki
Companies: anthropic, hugging face, openai






